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Abstract: This paper attempts to shed some light on the developments of welfare states in 
highly developed nations since World War Two (WW2) within the context of a narrative which 
seeks to combine institutional distinctions, termed “varieties of capitalism,” with the historical 
regimes of regulation theory in a political economy perspective which puts interested political 
actors at centre stage. It will be argued that in a liberal democracy, the elite has the framing 
and agenda-setting power to “manufacture a political will” according to its interests. The 
welfare state is not the result of a long social struggle on the part of the needy; rather, it 
results in its general features from the minimal state of meritocratic exigencies. Under the 
very peculiar circumstances of the post-WW2 era, this even translated into a rise in social 
welfare spending to more than a third of national income. The particular design of welfare 
state organisation was the subject-matter of political conflict, and a clear distinction between 
liberal and coordinated market economies can be attributed to cultural differences and 
institutional settings. Yet the core of the welfare state conception serves the interest of the 
meritocracy as much as those who benefit from social programmes and re-distribution. And 
the neoliberal attack on the welfare state since the 1980s is not a necessary re-calibration due 
to changing economic conditions or a growing lack of solidarity among the people but an 
expression of a modified cost-benefit analysis from the elite’s perspective. 
Key words: welfare state; Keynesian national welfare state; Schumpeterian competition state; 
elite; agenda theory  
 
1. Introduction 
The discussion about the welfare state is older than the welfare state itself: will an economy be 
able to shoulder the cost of a welfare state? Will the welfare state allow the lazy and 
unproductive to “soak the rich?” Is the welfare state sustainable in the age of globalisation? Is 
the welfare state adequately adjusting to the challenges of globalisation, ageing societies, and 
individualisation? Or is it being restructured as an unfortunate consequence of otherwise noble 
intentions (such as the uniting of Europe) or, perhaps worse, the backlash resulting from the 
pursuit of vested interests? 
Of course, this paper cannot address all these questions. That is neither the objective nor 
even possible in a research paper such as this. Instead, it attempts to shed some light on the 
developments of welfare states in highly developed nations since WW2 within the context of a 
narrative which seeks to combine institutional distinctions, termed “varieties of capitalism,” 
with the historical regimes of regulation theory in a political economy perspective which puts 
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interested political actors at centre stage. In this attempt, it extends an earlier paper on the 
political economy of modernisation (see Heise 2008). 
We are aware that this is an ambitious task. Likewise, we accept that many of the ideas 
advanced in this preliminary attempt to explain a very complex matter can be challenged and, 
at any rate, require refinement through further research. Nevertheless, we hope the present 
contribution provides a better understanding of what is currently happening in modern welfare 
states and the direction in which they seem to be heading. 
The paper is structured as follows: In the next part, the welfare state is defined, its origins 
traced, and a sketch of its quantitative development is outlined. That establishes the groundwork 
for the second part in which a political economy perspective is elaborated and empirically 
tested. The paper concludes with an outlook.    
 
2. The Welfare State in a Historical Perspective 
Although the welfare state is a fairly new concept, social policies and social provisions are not. 
Therefore, the welfare state appears to be more than the mere aggregation of social programmes 
in specific historical circumstances. Social policies and social provisions simply take account 
of the fact that individuals and families may not—for whatever reason—be able to sustain 
themselves economically and that, particularly in the absence of feudal relations, society 
somehow has to step in. In this sense, the “poor laws” (“poor law act” of 1601; see e.g., Frazer 
1984) can be understood as the beginning of social policies in the UK and later in the USA; 
similarly, company-based “family allowances” mark the start of social policy in France (see 
e.g., Castel 1995), while in the German-speaking world the so-called “social question” (“soziale 
frage”) highlighted the needs of “double-free” landworkers and their families after the end of 
feudal dependency (see e.g., Pankoke 1970). Social policies and provisions in this sense can be 
seen as being based on the rationale of natural law, intended to stabilise through policy an 
otherwise unstable society.  
 
2.1. What Is a Welfare State? 
The welfare state, which in reality developed only after WW2 in most highly developed 
countries of the Western world, is not merely the extension and development of such just-
mentioned social policies in the modern context. Rather, it is the summation and 
institutionalisation of all such policies designed to provide (and to finance) social public goods, 
to collectively interfere in the free market transactions of individual agents in order to change 
market outcomes (particularly income distribution), and to democratise economic relations. The 
welfare state, thus, comprises social policies to collectively (as opposed to individually) insure 
against systemic risks to life such as sickness, unemployment, old age, and poverty (financed 
via taxes and social contributions) as well as employment regimes covering labour markets, 
collective bargaining, worker participation systems, and macroeconomic policies designed to 
maintain high levels of employment. 
Different varieties of welfare systems developed following differing institutional and 
cultural paths. The most common types have been categorised as Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
“three worlds of welfare capitalism,” which distinguishes a social democratic, a continental, 
and a liberal model and as Peter Hall and David Soskice’s (2001) binary distinction between a 
liberal and a coordinated economic system. For the sake of simplicity, we base the following 
on the Hall/Soskice model: the liberal market economy (LME) combines a fairly meritocratic 
orientation with a firm belief in the virtues of flexible, unregulated markets and only very 
limited interventions of any kind. The focus is on allocative optimisation with few distributional 
objectives. The coordinated market economy (CME) is concerned more with productive 
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optimisation,1 which requires some encompassing organisations in the process of collective 
bargaining, a higher level of generosity regarding social public goods, and employee relations 
founded on participation in exchange for effort and commitment. In comparison with the liberal 
model, the production possibility frontier is pushed outwards, but at the same time income 
distribution is more equal. 
 
2.2. The Welfare State as the Outcome of Class Conflict? 
Social policies and programmes in the early period of capitalist development were rarely 
established through revolutionary actions on the part of the poor and underprivileged. Instead, 
they have been conceded by the ruling elite in order to appease the people and to integrate them 
into the power structure that eventually became the modern state. The earliest, embrionic 
version of a welfare state—Reichschancellor Bismarck’s Sozialstaat (welfare state) of the 
1870s—was a piece of realpolitik (real politics) designed to weaken the emerging social 
democrats and to offer the growing working classes and their trade unions a position in the 
newly formed Deutsche Reich.  
 
Figure 1. Total Social Expenditures as % of GDP 1880–1980 
 Source: Data from 1960 to 1979 corresponds to estimates based on OECD (1985). Data before 
1930 corresponds to Lindert (2004).  
 
A brief history of the development of welfare states must explain the extraordinary 
increase in welfare spending during and after WW2 that occurred in almost every country and 
particularly in the highly developed democratic nations in the West. As shown in Figure 1, 
social welfare spending quadrupled in Germany and Austria and increased more than a 
hundredfold in Italy between 1930 and 1980. 
                                                          
1 We need to elaborate a bit more on the distinction between “productive efficiency” and “allocative efficiency.” “Allocative 
efficiency” refers to the static logic of short-term equalisation of prices and marginal utility/marginal productivity via timeless 
quantity adjustments. “Productive efficiency,” on the other hand, refers to the dynamic logic of long-term output/income 
maximisation via regulatory and institutional incentives and complementarities (see e.g., Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 
2001). The trade-off between both efficiencies manifests the background to the different types of institutional embeddedness 
of economic activities that has been termed “varieties of capitalism” (see e.g., Hall and Soskice 2001; Hancké, Rhodes, and 
Thatcher 2007). 
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Basically, there are two ways to explain this development: a functional one and a realist 
one. The functionalist account argues that the transformational change of industrialising 
economies and societies demanded and, due to a growing similarity of working and living 
conditions and the insurability of similar life risks, facilitated the emergence of social 
programmes and is, therefore, “the root cause of welfare development” (Wilensky 1975, 35). 
The welfare state, according to this view, is the systemic answer to the needs of functionality. 
As always with functionalist theories, this one is difficult to falsify and, at any rate, must 
somehow be translated into political action. 
The realist account puts emphasis on political factors, arguing that the development of the 
welfare state directly mirrors class conflicts or, more indirectly, political partisanship in 
representative democratic societies.2 The implication is that the higher the power resources of 
the needy are—in terms of a strong labour movement with strong trade unions (Huber and 
Stephens 2001; Korpi 1983, 2006; Korpi and Palme 1998, 2003) and with leftist political parties 
winning elections—the better endowed and re-distributive the welfare state will be.  
With regard to conflicts, two main types of class conflict have been identified (e.g., see 
Edlund and Lindh 2015): political conflicts, that is political skirmishes between classes within 
the parliament, and social conflicts, which are based on tensions outside the domain of 
parliament, such as strikes and lock-outs within the labour market. As Edlund and Lindh (2015) 
argue, the welfare state shifts the power struggle from a social to a political conflict. In other 
words, with the establishment of welfare state arrangements, the power struggle of different 
classes or socio-economic groups is injected into the democratic decision-making process. In 
this interpretation, the foundations of welfare states extend back to social conflicts in the first 
place, which transform into political conflicts which, in turn, shape the development of the 
welfare state and must be able to explain the differences in welfare state endowments in terms 
of the outcome of the political conflict: countries with longer spells of leftist governments must 
clearly produce stronger welfare states than countries under more conservative (“rightist”) rule. 
However, neither the inter-war years nor the early years after WW2—i.e., those periods which 
must be regarded as giving birth to the modern welfare state—record large-scale social conflicts 
despite economic and social hardship for many people after the Great Depression and the 
devasting effects of warfare. Moreover, Table 1 clearly shows no distinct correlation between 
governmental partisanship and the opulence of the welfare state: although long spells of leftist 
governments in Sweden seem to correspond with the partisan theory of the highly endowed and 
highly re-distributive welfare states, this is obviously not the case for the USA or Germany: in 
the former, leftist governments produced only a “meager” welfare state, and in the latter, rightist 
goverments shaped one of the best endowed welfare states. Moreover, in the UK—as in the 
USA—the conceptual foundations of the welfare state enacted by “leftist” parties—the 
“Beveridge Plan” put into practice by the Labour government of Clement Attlee in the UK and 
the “New Deal” enacted by the Democrat president Franklin D. Roosevelt in the USA—were 
not the ideological weapons of staunch fighters for the underpriviledged but rather the ideas of 
liberal economists (John Maynard Keynes and William Beveridge in the case of the Beveridge 
Plan) and intended to serve “business interests” (for the “New Deal” see e.g., Henry 2018, 8). 
Therefore, while partisanship—representing the intensity of political conflict—may be helpful 
                                                          
2 The dominant theory of political economics, interestingly, does not recognise the category of “class conflict” as it deals only—
since it is based on methodological individualism—with individual actor’s choices. The resulting median voter theorem—the 
political equivalent of the representative economic actor—however, fails even to explain why rational voters vote in the first 
place and, secondly, fails to explain the “paradox of re-distribution”: under the ordinary assumption of a positive correlation 
between income inequality and the skewdness of income distribution towards the top income earners, the median voter theorem 
predicts higher re-distribution of welfare state measures with increasing income inequality, whereas evidence reveals the exact 
opposite (see e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2000, 121). Therefore, this kind of mainstream political economics is not considered 
here.  
 6 
 
in explaining differences in social protection and particular programmes, it cannot explain the 
rise of the welfare state at the end of WW2.         
Only recently has war received attention as a determinant in the development of the 
welfare state. On the demand side, war-related social needs (e.g., family support for war 
casualties) and health costs caused by war injuries created direct welfare claims. Moreover, at 
least indirectly, the pervasive uncertainty during wartime has been made responsible for calls 
for comprehensive social protection (see Dryzek and Goodin 1986). And finally, welfare state 
arrangements can be seen as an offer to share the burden of warfare more equally and as a 
compensation for those in military service by the rest of society. Conceding that the exorbitant 
growth in social protection coincides with the activities associated with WW2 and taking into 
account the fact that war-related social spending nowhere exceeded a third of total social 
spending (see Obinger and Schmitt 2018), the relation between waging war and the expansion 
of the welfare state is still open to discussion. It is likely not a fundamental cause (how could 
the development of the Swedish welfare state otherwise be explained? see Table 1). Yet warfare 
created the environment in which welfare states could flourish. This is clear in the emergence 
of societal solidarity and with that a commitment to accept high levels of taxation and income 
re-distribution; the emergence of antagonistic political and economic systems; and, as a result 
of massive destruction of durable consumption and capital goods and the ensuing need to 
replace those translating into greater propensity to consume and greater incentives to invest, 
such high growth rates turned the post-WW2 period not only into the “golden age of capitalism” 
but, at the same time, into the “golden age of the welfare state.”    
 
Table 1. Political Partisanship, Warfare, and the Welfare State 
Country Political partisanship of government in years 
during the period 1945–1980  
Index of 
war 
intensity 
Social 
expenditure 
in % of 
GDP in 
1980 
Re-
distribution+ 
 Right Middle-right Middle Middle-left Left    
France 10 5  7 3 4.7 20.23 2.25 
UK 18    17 5.3 15.58 1.32 
USA 16   19  1.8 12.84 1.43 
GER 17 3  11  8.8 21.79 2.33 
SWE   4  31 0 24.85 2.85 
AUT 4  17 4 10 8.5 21.59 2.19 
AUS 1  27  7 2.5 10.27 1.04 
NL 5  23 7  5.0 23.26 2.57 
Notes: Conservative/nationalistic parties are rated as “right,” liberal parties as “middle,” labour 
parties as “left,” and coalitions as “middle-right” or “middle-left,” depending on the leading 
party in the coalition; grey shading indicates a dominance of parties in the conservative-liberal 
political spectrum and below average of respective indicator; yellow shading indicates a 
dominance of parties in the middle-left to left political spectrum and above average of the 
respective indicator; + = expected benefit index at the end of period according to Scruggs with 
0 as minimum and 3 as maximum. 
Source: Obinger and Schmitt (2018, 505); Scruggs (2006); own calculation. 
 
2.3. The Welfare State in Modern Times—From Golden to Silver Age  
As we know, the “golden age” did not last: after the oil-related crisis of the 1970s, mass 
unemployment in highly developed nations became a lasting problem, growth rates declined, 
the societies started to age (i.e., the ratio of the retired population to the working age population 
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began to increase) and the process of growing global market integration put national economic 
and social governance under stress. 
Despite these undisputed developments, there are questions regarding how the welfare 
state evolved in the intervening decades: are we witnessing the “silver age” of the welfare state 
as it responds with remarkable resilience to the above-mentioned challenges by transformation 
and adaptation (see e.g., Taylor-Gooby 2002)? Or are we in a process of welfare state 
retrenchment in the neoliberal age (see e.g., Palley 2018)?     
  
Figure 2. Social Expenditure in Percent of GDP, 1980–2016 
 Source: Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). 
 
Figure 2 appears to support the “silver age” narrative of the welfare state: although there 
are some countries—those with better endowed welfare programmes such as Sweden and 
Germany—which have actually seen a moderate decline in overall social spending (as % of 
GDP), the OECD average is still rising. This macro-quantitative view, however, may be 
challenged when we look qualitatively at particular social policy programmes. Nevertheless, 
this may still fit well with the restructuring-resilience argument.  
But this argument is put in doubt once it is realised that during the past three decades much 
greater use has been made of the welfare state than before: unemployment has risen 
considerably, health costs have increased dramatically, and with the ageing of populations, 
pension and retirement costs also have increased significantly. This casts a skeptical shadow 
over the explanatory power of macro-quantitative data with respect to the endowment of 
welfare states (see e.g., Allan and Scruggs 2004; Korpi and Palme 2003). When Palley (2018) 
claims a neoliberal assault on the welfare state, he highlights, therefore, not only absolute 
spending levels, but refers to the generosity level and, implicitly, the re-distributive effect of 
the welfare programmes as much as structural characteristics, such as a shift from 
comprehensive (“universal rights”) to restricted (“means-tested”) coverage. 
Upon closer inspection, what looks superficially like surprising resilience may turn out to 
be a severe roll-back of the welfare state.     
 
3. The Political Economy of the Welfare State 
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People are related by economic, social, and political relations. Economic relations are seen as 
being basically characterised as intertemporal exchange relations, power relations, or relations 
based on nominal obligations with respect to the underlying ontological vision (neoclassical, 
Marxist, or post Keynesian). Individuals decide individually according to their preferences (or 
interests) and their material endowments. “Equality” and “justice” are not sensible criteria for 
economic relations. But “optimality” is. And optimal configurations of economic relations 
cannot be expected to govern (if at all) unless the place of their interaction—the market—shows 
very peculiar, heroic characteristics: perfect competition, perfect information, and perfect 
foresight. In the social and political realm, however, individuals decide collectively. In other 
words, they decide on issues which impact not only on their personal utility but on the welfare 
of all—the “common good.” Political and social relations can be hierarchical or symmetric, 
depending on the decision mechanism in use. Democratic societies, as opposed to dictatorships 
or autocratic societies, have opted for the “logic of equality,” that is, the idea that every member 
of the society is equally well qualified to decide on collective issues irrespective of his material 
endowments or position in the society: one citizen, one vote. Moreover, “qualification” in this 
respect does not imply certain capabilities but merely the collectively shared idea of equal 
rights. Thus, economic and social or political relations in democracies differ in two important 
ways: economic relations are notoriously unequal and need to be tamed by market regulations, 
while political and social relations are intrinsically symmetric. On the other hand, following 
one’s own vested interest in economic relations does not (necessarily) conflict with the idea of 
maximising the welfare of society and may even be a requirement for this objective (Adam 
Smith’s famous “invisible hand”). However, in political and social relations, diverging vested 
interests of individuals, groups or classes may pose serious problems because they may render 
impossible the formation of a “common will,” which is necessary in order to decide on the 
desired provision of collective or public goods to serve the “common good.” This phenomenon 
is known as Arrow’s “impossibility theorem,” implying that any collectively established 
welfare function entails the high likelihood of preference orderings representing merely relative 
majorities, in other words, absolute minorities. In order to legitimise such an outcome, the 
decision-making process must be acceptable to all.  
 
3.1. Different Forms of Democracy 
The legitimacy of democratic social and political relations, hence, stems from its decision-
making process (input legitimacy), not some kind of functional outcome in terms of economic 
growth, income distribution, or other criteria (output legitimacy). The “common good” needs 
to be derived from the preferences of the individuals forming a society; it cannot be 
superimposed by some organic (functional) description; yet functional outcome may impact on 
the actual choice being made under a given decison-making framework. 
Classical theories of democracy argue that majority voting is the best possible way to 
secure Abraham Lincoln’s dictum of “government of the people, by the people, and for the 
people” because it best fulfils the criteria of maximising self-determination, utility, and the 
likelihood of producing correct decisions (see Dahl 1989, 138ff.). 3  Alternatives such as 
supermajorities or quasi-guardianships score worse on these criteria, and limited notions of 
democracy such as Riker’s “liberal democracy,” which restricts the objective of democratic 
majority voting to “removing elected officials from office when the citizens become dissatisfied 
with their performance” (Dahl 1989, 154; paraphrasing Riker 1982, 181ff.), may be accepted 
as interpretations of real-world representative democracies linking output and input legitimacy, 
but they do not challenge the supremacy claim of democratic majority voting.      
                                                          
3 “I assume that a key characteristic of a democracy is the continued responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its 
citizens, considered as political equals” (Dahl 1971, 1).  
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3.2. Democracy in an Agenda-Theoretical Perspective—Minority Rule of the Elite 
Although in terms of “input legitimacy” there may be no better decision-making process than 
majority voting, neither Lincoln’s idea of “classical democracies” where no one has the power 
over someone else nor “liberal democracies” as mechanisms to put governments under popular 
scrutiny may be seen as adequately portraying modern representative democracies. This may 
be the case, as claimed by democratic elitism (see e.g., Best and Higley 2009), because the 
representation needed in mass societies creates principal-agent-problems: politicians and 
legislators are not simply the ambassadors of their voters; they moreover follow their own 
interests. But due to the professionalisation inherent in any divison of labour, they come to form 
an elite which is supposed to know the common will better than the ordinary voter—or, as 
Schumpeter put it, the common will is manufactured in much the same way as consumption 
patterns are created by advertisement and applied psychology, rather than being the objective 
representations of free and self-determined consumers.4 
As true as this may be, there is another point to be made: as the impossibility theorem 
suggests, the common will in heterogeneous societies cannot consistently be formed by way of 
simple aggregation. Notwithstanding this impossibility, majority voting has become the most 
tolerated form by which to arrive at a common will. Yet this comes with two major drawbacks: 
the majority outcome in truly heterogeneous societies in fact mirrors the preferences of a 
minority. As we know from the “voting paradox,” those minority preferences which can make 
best use of the agenda-setting and agenda-building process in the political arena will prevail: 
whoever is able to influence the voting process in a way that his preferences (interests) get 
particular attention will increase the likelihood of making his preference ordering a matter of 
general welfare. This has been addressed in the literature as “cyclical majorities,” pointing to 
the fact that majority voting may not result in stable outcomes with regard to shaping the 
“common will.” What from a functional perspective may be seen as problematic (ever changing 
policy orientations) may be regarded as a democratic virtue because it may give everyone the 
chance to determine the common will eventually. Yet, this is exactly what agenda theory casts 
into doubt: under the assumption of serious information problems within the electorate, the 
framing process of political issues becomes an important tool for effectively asserting one’s 
own preferences. And as the framing process in modern democracies is basically controlled by 
the media (see e.g., McCombs and Shaw 1972), there is a strong bias in the framing of political 
issues as the “common will” towards such interests that are either aligned with the interests of 
the media as capitalist corporations 5  or with the media elites running the communication 
business. To summarize the argument put forward on the basis of elite and agenda theory, 
“liberal or competitive democracy” in Riker’s and Schumpeter’s sense has a strong tendency to 
                                                          
4 Schumpeter (1976, 263) puts it, 
  
The only point that matters here is that, human nature in politics being what it is, they are able to fashion and, 
within wide limits, even to create the will of the people. What we are confronted with in the analysis of political 
processes is largely not a genuine but a manufactured will. . . . The ways in which issues and the popular will on 
any issue are being manufactured is exactly analogous to the way of commercial advertising. 
 
5 There were times when, at least, part of the media were not simply capitalist enterprises but influential voices of religious or 
ideological groups (parties). The more diverse the underlying motivations of producing media products, the more dissonant the 
framing process may be.   
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favour minority preferences which are shaped by the media or capitalist elite. 6 , 7  In a 
Machiavellian manner, it is the task of this elite to use its power in such a way that the majority 
will not lose its confidence in the democratic makeup and goals of the elite’s government; in 
other words, they must keep faith in the “common good” assumption of this kind of “liberal or 
competitive democray.” This faith may be undermined simply if the elite makes no attempt to 
camouflage its interests as “common good” or if the outcome is so appalling that the process 
which creates such an outcome is contested.          
 
3.3. The Elite’s Interest and the Welfare State 
The underlying assumption is the following: a “liberal democracy” safeguards the meritocratic 
interests of the elite by allowing them to set the political agenda and the agenda-building 
process. In doing so, the meritocracy is able to install a “minority rules” state as opposed to the 
“majority rule” which may “soak the rich” via a strongly re-distributive welfare state.8 The 
interests of the meritocracy can be narrowed to the maximisation of absolute and relative net-
income.9 In order to realise this objective, market income (gross) needs to be determined as 
much as possible by deregulated markets, while net income needs to be distorted as little as 
possible by taxes and social contributions, based on fiscal equivalence and re-distribution only 
as much is needed in order to guarantee social stability (the Macciavelli standard). However, in 
order to reach its highest possible market income, some regulations (e.g., unfair dismissal 
regulations, co-determinantion rights, collective bargaining agreements, or, more generally, 
collective employee relations) may help to maximise productive efficiency—in other words, a 
trade-off (conflict) between productive and allocative efficiency may develop.       
 
Table 2. Varieties of Capitalism and Varieties of State Conceptions  
 Liberal Market Economy Coordinated Market 
Economy 
Keynesian National 
Welfare State (KNWS) 
 
(1950s—1970s) 
- Social security system 
based on Beveridge 
orientation (means tested) 
- Strong trade union rights 
- decentralised collective 
bargaining system with 
strong “local pushfulness” 
- Social security sytem based 
on Bismarck orientation 
(comprehensive) 
- Strong labour market 
regulation + participation 
rights 
                                                          
6 The concept of the “elite” is difficult to define precisely. In the research on elites, they are taken as that circle of people who 
are in a position to have a definitive influence on political and economic decisions or, as Lopez (2013, 3; italics in the original) 
puts it:  
 
 . . . the state-of-the-art concept of elites is more closely related to the Weberian notion of power, understood as 
the capability of implementing one’s will, even against the will of others (. . .). Power can be achieved through 
material and/or symbolic resources. Consequently, elites can be defined as those in possession of those resources 
(. . .).  
 
7 It is often claimed that there is no such thing as “the” elite, but the elite are functionally differentiated (e.g., economic, political, 
cultural elite, etc.) and very heterogeneous in their interests. However, it is also often claimed that the elites are not so different 
in their socio-economic pedigree and, at least with respect to their meritocratic orientation, show very similar interests. It is the 
case, therefore, that the capitalist and media elite which have been focused on so far can be broadened towards the meritocratic 
interests of the elite without further specification.  
8  Larry M. Bartels (2008, 285) concludes his study “unequal democray” with this passage: “. . . affluent people have 
considerable clout, while the preferences of the people in the bottom third of the income distribution have no apparent impact 
on the behavior of their elected officials.” That description of the situation in the USA can be seen as an ordinary characteristic 
of a “liberal democracy.”  
9 Although it is unclear whether the prime interest of the elite is “power” or “wealth,” the relation of these two objectives 
appears to be complementary rather than substitutional. In any case, it is the common procedure in political economics to take 
income as the predominant factor determining the utility of groups or classes; see e.g., Persson and Tabellini (1999).  
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- Keynesian demand 
management 
- strong capital controls 
 
- centralised collective 
bargaining system 
- Keynesian demand 
management 
- strong capital controls 
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Source: Own account. 
     
In this setting, liberal democracy is compatible only with a minimal state in the sense that 
re-distributive state action comprising interventions into not only the process of income 
generation and distribution but also the (re-)distribution of power (at the individual level as 
decommodification or the collective level as participation) will be accepted only in an output-
oriented perspective as long as it pleases the meritocracy.10 Such minimal states may look very 
different over time, taking differing historical settings into account, and also very different 
across nations, taking differing cultural norms and backgrounds and institutional settings into 
account (see Table 2). Therefore, we may end up with a “variety of liberal capitalisms” showing 
quite different levels of re-distribution, decommodification, and participation—i.e., welfare 
state organisations—over time (i.e., Keynesian national welfare states of the “golden age of 
capitalism” to Schumpeterian competition states of the “silver age of capitalism”) and across 
nations (i.e., liberal economies, coordinated economies). 
KNWS and SCS are variations of liberal (i.e., meritocratic) capitalism. While the postwar 
years experienced a phase of system competition and a strong popular belief in technocratic 
governability (socio-cybernetics), the meritocracy was forced to prove that capitalism can 
handle the potential trade-off between productive efficiency and allocative efficiency better 
than its counterpart in the socialist world. Although productive superiority was seemingly easy 
to prove, it was not supposed to come at the cost of a clearly inferior distributional result, 
showing much more absolute and relative poverty among the non-meritocracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10  The exact process of how the elite manage to make their interests the subject of the “common good” pursued by 
democratically elected governments of different partisanship must be the subject-matter of further research of the kind found 
in Heise (2005). It may be worth mentioning that the convergence of party programmes explained by public choice theories to 
be the result of the “median voter theorem” can also be interpreted as the result of the agenda-setting and framing power of the 
elite creating “policy constraints” which parties of any partisanship have to accept (see e.g., Merkel 2001). 
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Figure 3. Determination of Re-distribution in Varieties of Liberal Democracies 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 attempts to capture these ideas. From a meritocratic perspective, the optimal size 
of re-distribution through welfare state programmes is determined in two different varieties of 
capitalism: the LME and the CME. The LME is characterised by a more uncritical belief in the 
virtues of free markets, 11  less regulation of labour markets, and weaker labour market 
institutions, fostering a capital market-based short-term profit-maximisation strategy 
(“shareholder-value”). Yet it entertains a stronger belief that income inequality is a necessary 
and tolerated sign of success (“meritocratic culture”). The CME relies more on bank-based 
long-term profit maximisation (“stakeholder value”), fostering incentives to enhance 
productive efficiency to the detriment of market flexibility (allocative efficiency). This includes 
both labour market regulations to increase human capital investments and worker participation 
schemes. This goes along with the idea that the cohesion of society allows for only a certain 
income inequality (“egalitarian culture”). The upper left quadrant of Figure 3 depicts the idea 
that a growing income inequality will increase the income of the meritocratic elite only to a 
certain point. Once this point is surpassed, absolute income of the meritocracy will fall although 
relative income (income inequality) will continue to rise. This may be so because aggregate 
                                                          
11 Such a belief may be culturally enshrined in a way that actors fail to realise the options available to them, which have been 
brought to light by the research on “varieties of capitalism.” For instance, when confronted with research results indicating that 
German style employee relations based on participation rights and labour market regulations give German companies a 
competitive advantage based on higher labour productivity even within the confines of a “liberal market economy” (see 
Tüselmann, McDonald, and Heise 2003), British managers declared that they simply cannot handle any kind of cooperative 
labour relations.  
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demand may suffer from ever increasing income inequality as much as the cost of protecting 
income-generating wealth will rise. Due to differences in cultures, the point of maximum 
income of the elite will be at higher income inequality in the LMEs as compared to the CMEs. 
And because LMEs favour allocative efficiency over productive efficiency, absolute income 
determined by total factor productivity may be lower in LMEs than in CMEs.  
The lower right quandrant illustrates that some re-distribution from the successful to the 
less successful market participants will be necessary in order to maximise the income for the 
meritocracy. Feelings of insecurity associated with the opening of an economy to the global 
market or the introduction of new technologies (enhancing allocative as well as productive 
efficiency) may well cause costly opposition to such developments and result in demands for 
social compensation; in other words, part of the overall gain will have to be re-distributed to 
the potential losers of such developments. And as the CMEs favour productive over allocative 
efficiency, they may generate higher per-capita income but might be compelled to pay higher 
compensation to the non-meritocracy.     
Finally, the upper right quadrant portrays the mechanism by which income inequality is 
basically brought about: disequilibrium in the labour market—i.e., unemployment—will put 
pressure on the wage bargaining process—as the main determinant of income distribution (see 
Förster 2000)—in order to bring about the desired income inequality. And here, the stronger 
institutions of CMEs need more pressure (i.e., higher unemployment) to produce a certain 
inequality than LMEs do. However, LMEs may only de jure be more flexible and less resistant 
to labour market pressure but not de facto. As Soskice (1990, 50f) reports, the absence of 
comprehensive labour market regulations, including labour action and collective bargaining 
legislation, may well result in strong “local pushfulness” from the trade unions at the company-
level if unionisation is strong and conflict-oriented.12 In such a case, as indicated in Figure 3 by 
the dashed line, the unemployment rate necessary to create the intended income inequality may 
even be higher in LMEs than in CMEs.  
What Figure 3 shows is a “meritocratically optimal rate of unemployment” (MORU) and 
a “meritocratic minimal state” (MMS) comprising social programmes with re-distributive 
effect. MORU and MMS will look quite different with respect to the organisation of the 
economic systems: MORU is likely to be higher in CMEs while MMS will be less re-
distributive in LMEs.13 Of course, MORU and MMS are only optimal states from a meritocratic 
point of view. The actual state of unemployment and the welfare system depends on many 
factors such as the degree to which the meritocracy is effectively able to enforce its interest as 
the “common will” in the political system and to what degree the meritocracy is able to enforce 
the policies necessary to establish the desired MORU. The latter depends on the ability of the 
meritocracy to dominate the public discourse in terms of agenda-building and its ability to 
dominate economic research and economic councilling in terms of agenda-setting and policy 
framing.  
Moreover, MORU and MMS are also time-dependent. As Figure 4 shows, distributive 
cultures may vary over time as much as the institutional structure of an economy and the 
orientation of public policy-making. In the years after WW2, the elite in Western capitalist 
economies were faced with a very intricate situation: during the Great Depression capitalism 
had proven to be extremely unstable, and in its attempt to better economic and social conditions 
                                                          
12 Many of the policy reforms of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the USA proclaimed as “deregulation” 
and “flexibilisation” measures (OECD 1994, 105) were, in fact, regulations—yet very one-sided to the detriment of trade unions 
only (see e.g., Heise 1997).   
13 In this little model, the puzzle known as “paradox of redistribution” or the “Robin Hood paradox” “in which redistribution 
from rich to poor is least present when and where it seems most needed” (Lindert 2004, 15), is comfortably explained by the 
pursuit of elite interests in different institutional and cultural settings different from electoral systems such as “proportional” 
or “majoritarian” as in Iversen and Soskice (2006). However, as there seems to be a strong correlation between the different 
electoral and economic systems, we might be faced with the statistical problem of multicollinearity here.   
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for its respective people it became extremely mercantilistic and dangerous to the international 
order. The liberal idea that the pursuit of individual and national interests can be reconciled 
with both the common good and a stable and peaceful international order was anything but 
obvious.14 At the same time, communism took centre stage in history, challenging capitalism 
as the “natural” order. Behind the emerging “iron curtain,” a different economic system—“real 
existing socialism” under Soviet hegemony—had been established, putting pressure on those 
who wanted to restore capitalist order under democratic conditions: they had to prove that 
capitalism performs better in the economic realm (measured by levels and growth rates of per-
capita income) and in the social realm as well (measured in terms of the distribution of income 
and poverty rates).15 Additionally, the experience of warfare over the past decade had not only 
strengthened the collective feelings and motives for solidarity (at the supply side) on the one 
hand and a claim for collective support (at the demand side) on the other, but also had brought 
about a level of state expenditure financed by unprecedented tax rates—providing financial 
space for democratic governments to divert public expenditure away from military purposes. 
Finally, in the area of economics a new approach—Keynesianism—began to dominate; it not 
only was able to explain the occurence of the Great Depression; it appeared also to provide the 
economic tools—demand management—in order to cope with capitalist instability in the future. 
And as social policies and their re-distributive effects could be easily integrated into Keynesian 
economic governance, as well as the existing constraints on international mobility of 
commodities and factors of production still in place after the protectionism of WW2, a regime 
became acceptable and desirable to the meritocracy which has been dubbed “Keynesian 
national welfare state” (KNWS16) by regulation theorists (see Jessop 2004).17 One of the best 
                                                          
14 The critical attitude towards the capitalist order had already emerged after WW1 and became more pronounced after the 
Great Depression in the late 1920s and after WW2. As early as 1922, Ludwig von Mises, a prominent liberal economist, wrote:  
 
The supporters of Socialism . . . are not confined to the Bolshevists . . . or to the members of the numerous 
socialist parties; all are socialists who consider the socialistic order of society economically and ethically superior 
to that based on private ownership of the means of production. . . . If we define Socialism as broadly as this we 
see that the great majority of people are with socialism today. Those who confess to the principles of Liberalism 
and who see the only possible form of economic society in an order based on private ownership of the means of 
production are few indeed. (von Mises [1922] 1932, 26–27) 
 
15 Obinger and Lee (2013, 259) point out that, 
 
The rivalry between the West and the communist bloc during the Cold War was not restricted to military tensions 
but also included fierce economic and social competitions. As its core stood the performance of ideologically 
conflicting regimes with regard to policy outcomes, sports, cultural achievements, technology, and economic 
well-being. The resulting ambitions to outcompete the rival bloc/country and to flaunt the achievements of one’s 
own political and economic regimes were strongly driven by the vested interests of the political elites, notably 
ambitions to enhance regime legitimacy. During the Cold War, governments of all kinds were reliant on achieving 
mass compliance among their populations and gaining political legitimacy since mass loyalty and domestic 
political stability were prerequisites for succeeding in this conflict. 
 
Gilman (2017) also states that,  
 
Although some US conservatives never fully accepted the principle of redistribution, the Cold War context—that 
is, the threat posed by the alternative of Communism—meant that from the 1930s through the 1970s, even 
Republican Presidents like Dwight D. Eisenhower and Richard M. Nixon basically accepted the Keynesian, mixed-
economy framework and the support of welfare programs. President Nixon even went so far as to promote a 
Guaranteed Minimum Income—a program very similar to a Universal Basic Income (UBI), the darling idea of 
today’s Left. 
 
16 Actually, there are different labels in use. Most common is Jessop’s “Keynesian welfare national state.” Simply for linguistic 
reasons, I prefer to call this state conception “Keynesian national welfare state.”  
17 Although there is a clear co-integration between the institutional and regulatory frame named KNWS and the “golden age” 
of capitalism, the direction of causality is unclear: regulation theorists argue that the “golden age” of capitalism is based on the 
KNWS because its institutions temporarily pacified the capital-labour conflict intrinsic in capitalist production and, thereby, 
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known and most intensively researched examples of such a KNWS is the “Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft” (see e.g., Heise and Görmez Heise 2013) in Germany, which had been 
established under conservative rather than socialist or social democratic governments. 
Figure 4 captures these ideas accordingly: in the upper left quadrant, income inequality, 
coupled with the income of the meritocracy, favouring a rather egalitarian income distribution 
even from the perspective of the elite, is termed “post-WW2 collectivism.” In the upper right 
quandrant, the institutional constraints for putting pressure on the collective bargaining system 
via unemployment are portrayed and dubbed “coordinated economy during KNWS”; these 
show rather strong potenial to provide resistance, taking CME as an example. Moreover, the 
lower right quadrant sheds light on the re-distributive content of the KNWS resulting from a 
cost-benefit analysis (portrayed in lower part of Figure 4): in a situation of pending system 
competition and a high demand on solidarity related to the war, a growing re-distributional 
impact of welfare state arrangements provides rising utility to the meritocrats, yet at ever falling 
margins. On the other hand, rising costs are correlated not only in terms of lower absolute and 
relative income but also in terms of power sharing with a welfare state expansion which not 
only re-distributes income but also increases the degree of decommodification of labour. The 
MMS is given where utility exceeds cost the most or, put differently, where marginal utility of 
a re-distributive welfare state equals marginal cost.     
Clearly, with changing conditions, both the cost-benefit situation and the distributional 
culture can change significantly. While the cost may remain largely unaltered, the benefits of a 
re-distributional welfare system may diminish when the competition between systems 
disappears because of the collapse of the alternative system. This development may be 
strengthened as a result of growing economic globalisation intensifying local competition 
(“Standortkonkurrenz”). Moreover, a shift in economic policy orientation from Keynesian 
demand management towards neoliberal supply-side policies triggered by a paradigm shift in 
the economic discipline from Keynesian to monetarist-neoclassical economics may additionally 
undermine, from the perspective of the elite, the potential benefits of a welfare state. The regime 
formation under such altered conditions and the desired MMS of the globalised age has been 
dubbed “Schumpeterian competition state” (SCS). In conjunction with a change in the 
distributional culture towards “postmodern individualism” favouring more inequality (as 
depicted in the upper left quadrant of Figure 4) and institutional change towards deregulation 
and decentralisation of labour markets and collective bargaining systems (shown in the upper 
right quadrant of Figure 4), the diffrent characteristics of MORU and MMS can be described 
under the different state conceptions of KNWS and SCS. During periods of KNWS, income 
inequality is lower and the re-distributional content of the welfare state greater than in SCS, 
while MORU will be higher in SCS as long as labour market institutions remain generally 
stable.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
slowed down the falling trend in the profit rate. However, from a non-Marxist perspective, the “golden age” of capitalism, 
considered as the result of a major catching-up process after the massive destruction of productive capital during WW2, could 
well be interpreted as the economic basis of a KNWS.  
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Figure 4. Determination of Re-distribution in Different Historical Settings 
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If the political economic interpretation of the development of the welfare state given above as 
an expression of the minimal state from a meritocratic perspective in different historical and 
institutional settings is valid, we need to find empirical traces with respect to the development 
Income 
inequality 
Income of 
highest decile 
Income of 
highest decile 
45° Re-distribution 
UNR 
Coordinated economy during SCS 
Coordinated 
economy during 
KNWS 
Postmodern 
individualism 
Post-WW2-
collectivism 
KNWS 
SCS 
Cost, 
utility 
Marginal cost, 
marginal utility 
Re-distribution 
utility (KNWS) 
cost  
utility (SCS) 
MU (KNWS) 
MU (SCS) 
MC  
 17 
 
of the MORU as the trigger as well as the re-distributional content of the MMS and the relative 
income of the elite as the objectives.    
  
Table 3. Changing Patterns of Welfare State Characteristics over Time and across Nations; 17 
OECD Nations, 1960–2010 
 KNWS* SCS** 
 Liberal+ Coordinated++ Liberal+ Coordinated++ 
Unemployment 
rate° 
4.5 4.2 6.2 7.6 
Income 
inequality°° 
0.31 0.25 0.33 0.27 
Re-
distribution(1)#  
-0.12 -0.19 -0.13 -0.2 
Re-distribution 
(2)## 
1.61 2.39 
(2.45) 
1.55 2.28 
(2.28) 
Notes: * 1960–1990; ** 1991–2010; + Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, USA, UK; ++ Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Finland, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden; ° average over the respective period; °° Gini-coefficient at the 
end of the respective period, no comparable data available for Japan, New Zealand and 
Belgium; # difference between Gini-coefficient of market and disposable income at the end of 
the respective period, no comparable data available for Japan, New Zealand and Belgium; ## 
expected benefit index at the end of the respective period (KNWS, 1987; SCS, 2002) according 
to Scruggs with 0 as minimum and 3 as maximum, data in brackets: without Italy as Italian data 
appear questionable. 
Source: Scruggs (2006); Ameco databank; Caminada et. al (2017); Wang and Caminada (2017). 
 
The picture is clear and as predicted (see Table 3): LMEs show a markedly more unequal 
income distribution than CMEs, independent of the historical circumstances. Yet the re-
distributive effect of the welfare state is more pronounced in CMEs. Moreover, the re-
distributive effect has declined over time independently of the institutional setting. Due to an 
ageing population, the immense increase in health costs and an increase in unemployment, i.e., 
an exposure of a larger part of the population to welfare programmes, the welfare state has 
neither consistently declined in size—in terms of social expenditures in relation to GDP (see 
Figure 2 and part 2.2.)18—nor in its re-distributive effect, if measured by a change in income 
inequality before and after taxation and social transfers by Gini-coefficients (see row 3 in Table 
3). However, if the “generosity” of the welfare state is measured by coverage ratio and financial 
alimentation per individual case (see row 4 in Table 3), it appears hard to deny that the re-
distributional content of welfate state systems has declined—and this is even more pronounced 
if instead of the average of pre- and post-welfare-Gini-coefficients, the quintiles are compared 
on the income scale. While re-distribution towards the lowest income quintile decreased by 
about 1%  during the SCS period compared with the KNWS period, we see re-distribution 
                                                          
18 If one takes a more differentiated picture by focusing on different social policy areas and taking into account that the 
number of recipients (i.e., unemployed) may have changed, the result changes even with respect to overall social expenditure 
levels:  
 
“ . . . our results strongly suggest that welfare states are less resilient than envisioned in the literature on “new 
politics” (. . .). In fact, the 1990s—. . . seem to mark a turning point. Until then, only the speed of expansion 
decelerated but since then an actual trend reversal has taken place. Welfare states are no longer simply growing 
at a slower pace but shrinking. At the same time, social spending is directed less at curbing inequality and more 
oriented towards the elderly and services. As a consequence, the welfare state becomes less decommodifying 
and more supportive of markets” (Elsässer, Rademacher, and Schäfer 2015, 9). 
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towards the highest income quintile (or, rather, the reduction in contributing to re-distribution) 
increased by about 0.6% before the time of the world financial crisis (see Causa and Hermansen 
2018, 42; after the world financial crisis, due to rising unemployment, the re-distributional 
contents increased slightly, only to start to decrease again when the economies started to recover 
and austerity programmes started to show an impact).    
Moreover, the unemployment rate increased quite significantly during the SCS era as 
compared to the KNWS period, in both the LMEs as well as the CMEs (see row 1 in Table 3). 
However, during the KNWS period, unemployment was slightly lower in CMEs as compared 
to LMEs. This would be consistent with our proposed model only if we assume “strong local 
pushfulness” as a characteristic of LMEs. Of course, most economic and labour market reforms 
in LMEs at the beginning of the 1980s sought to curb the power of trade unions and deregulate 
labour markets. Once these measures started to have an impact, the unemployment rate in LMEs 
fell below the unemployment rate in CMEs.19 
Finally, the ultimate objective of the meritocracy—income maximisation— showed a very 
peculiar development which appears entirely consistent with the approach presented here (see 
Table 4): independently of the economic system, the relative income of the top income earners 
(10th income decile) declined during the KNWS period under the conditions explained above—
and more so in CMEs than in LMEs. However, this decline, as compared to the pre-war years, 
was more than reversed during the SCS period when the collective and system pressure on the 
meritocracy dwindled—and more so in LMEs than in CMEs.   
 
Table 4. Top Decile Income Share in LME and CME across Time and Nations 
 (1) 
1950 
(2) 
1979 
(3) 
2010 
(4) 
KNWS 
(2—1) 
(5) 
SCS 
(3—2) 
LME+ 0.33 0.31 0.38 -0.02 +0.07 
      
CME++ 0.33 0.28 0.33 -0.05 +0.05 
Notes: + denotes Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, USA, UK; ++ denotes 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Netherlands. 
Source: World Inequality Database (http://wid.world.data) and Piketty (2014, Chap.9). 
   
4. Conclusion 
In a liberal democracy, the elite has the framing and agenda-setting power to “manufacture a 
political will” (see Schumpeter 1976, 263) according to its interests.20 The welfare state, “one 
of the great social innovations of the 20th century” (Palley 2018, 32), is not the result of a long 
social struggle on the part of the needy; rather, it results in its general features from the minimal 
state of meritocratic exigencies. Under the very peculiar circumstances of the post-WW2 era, 
this even translated into a rise in social welfare spending to more than a third of national 
income—up from less than a twentieth of GDP at the beginning of the 20th century. The 
                                                          
19 While the average unemployment rate in LMEs as compared to CMEs during the 1960s was 2.6% to 1.9% and 3.9% to 3.7 
% in the 1970s, it rose to 7.0% as compared to 7.1% in the 1980s and 6.9% to 8.3% in the 1990s (own calculations; sources: 
see Table 3). 
20 Thorstein Veblen (1919, 160f) pinpointed this insight already as early as the beginning of the 20th centrury when he declared 
in his famous The Vested Interest and the Common Man:  
 
So that the population of these civilised countries now falls into two main classes: those who own wealth invested 
in large holdings and who thereby control the conditions of life for the rest; and those who do not own wealth in 
sufficiently large holdings, and whose conditions of life are therefore controlled by these others. It is a division, 
not between those who have something and those who have nothing—as many socialists would be inclined to 
describe it—but between those who own wealth enough to make it count, and those who do not.  
 19 
 
particular design of welfare state organisation was the subject-matter of political conflict, and 
a clear distinction between liberal and coordinated market economies can be attributed to 
cultural differences and institutional settings. Yet the core of the welfare state conception serves 
the interest of the meritocracy as much as those who benefit from social programmes and re-
distribution. And the neoliberal attack on the welfare state since the 1980s is not a necessary 
re-calibration due to changing economic conditions or a growing lack of solidarity among the 
people but an expression of a modified cost-benefit analysis from the elite’s perspective. 
Taking into consideration that the recent world financial crisis has been exploited to 
increase the pressure on the welfare state by introducing austerity measures allegedly in order 
to sustain public finances, one might argue that the future of the welfare state might look bleak. 
However, this is not the only possible direction forward: with the digital revolution and the 
growing importance of social media, the meritocracy’s agenda-setting and framing power may 
be undermined (see e.g., Gillmor 2004; McCombs 2005; Meraz 2009). It may be too early to 
judge the full consequences of these structural changes in the media landscape, but it might 
help to relax the “political constraints” of the meritocracy’s “TINA” rhetoric. 
Moreover, the elite remains constrained by the democratic scrutiny of the majority and the 
possibility that a high cost on their income can be imposed upon them. Ignoring these 
constraints by becoming (overly) impudent may also undermine the elite’s agenda-setting and 
framing power: alternative narratives that favour alternative interests will receive more 
attention and followers, perhaps becoming dominant. This may be good news for leftist parties 
but, as recent developments suggest, may equally benefit populist parties, bringing them to 
greater prominence.21  While leftist parties would point to the growing demand for social 
security measures, including re-distributional effects in a quickly globalising world (see e.g., 
Swank and Betz 2003; Houtman, Achterberg, and Derks 2008), populist parties would—in an 
attempt to turn back the clock and to fight the alleged causes of the incriminated effects—rather 
than strengthen the national confines by protectionist measures (instead of compensating the 
potential losers of economic globalisation) possibly mixed with chauvinistic measures to focus 
any remaining welfare state programmes on national subjects only (see Michel 2014, 171ff).     
Obviously, both potential reactions are anti-meritocratic in the sense that they reject the 
elite’s pretention merely to pursue the “common good.” Therefore, the elite might be inclined 
to instrumentalise the anti-meritocratic mood—rather than to regain dominance over the 
agenda-setting and framing process—by combining populist political conceptions of the “us 
and them” kind with neoliberal economic and social policies. The Trump administration, one 
of the richest and most elitist governments in the history of the USA with respect to the socio-
economic pedigree of the president and his state secretaries, appears to play this game. 
However, although there might be conceptual analogies between right-wing populism and 
neoliberal market fundamentalism (as the basis of meritocratic economic and social policies; 
see Pühringer and Ötsch 2018), this kind of anti-elitism on the part of the elite resembles a 
“riding the tiger” strategy—a strategy that Karl Polanyi in The Great Transformation saw as 
responsible for the rise of fascism (Polanyi 1944, 242). Let’s hope that history will not repeat 
itself.   
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